[Ach] Proposal to Remove legacy TLS Ciphersuits Offered by Firefox

[Aaron Zauner]

Hi Kurt,

That is true, the issue being that some software and hardware platforms do
not support RSA keys above 2048bit as of now.

I mean - I do not really have an issue with discussing to put 3DES in
there. We were a bit time restricted to do our research (i.e. we limited
ourselves to certain ciphers) and since this is still in draft stage we're
able to change things like that.

Input from anyone else on the list?

Thanks,
Aaron


On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 4:27 PM, Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be> wrote:

> On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 12:19:10AM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote:
> >
> > > 3DES isn't broken.
> > Triple DES provides about 112bit security (We've a section on the topic
> in the Paper in the Keylenghts section). All ciphers that we
> > recomend are at least at 128bit security.
>
> The document doesn't seem to say that it's trying to reach a 128
> bit security level over the whole chain.  It seems to be happy
> with 2048 bit RSA keys.  They also provide 112 bit security.
>
> If you really want to go for 128 bit, you need to have the RSA
> keys of at least something in the order of 3072 bit.  If 2048
> is fine, 3DES is fine.
>
>
> Kurt
>
>
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