[Ach] New study on Forward Secrecy

[Hanno Böck]

Hi,

On Tue, 30 Dec 2014 18:25:44 +0100
Aaron Zauner <azet at azet.org> wrote:

> Forward secrecy guarantees that eavesdroppers simply
> cannot reveal secret data of past communications. While
> many TLS servers have deployed the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
> (DHE) key exchange to support forward secrecy, most sites use
> weak DH parameters resulting in a false sense of security. In
> our study, we surveyed a total of 473,802 TLS servers and
> found that 82.9% of the DHE-enabled servers were using weak
> DH parameters. Furthermore, given current parameter and

There should be something said about these numers: They were from
january 2014. apache only added support for > 1024 bit in november 2013.
I assume it's likely much higher now, although probably still in a bad
state.

I was highly confused by the fact they claim that only 14 servers
supported 4096 bit DH. That'd mean that I would run a significant
portion of those.

-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

mail/jabber: hanno at hboeck.de
GPG: BBB51E42
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