[Ach] bettercrypto.org cert blocked in chrome 56

Alice Wonder alice at librelamp.com
Tue Nov 29 00:37:31 CET 2016

On 11/28/2016 03:04 PM, sivmu wrote:
> Am 28.11.2016 um 23:23 schrieb Alice Wonder:
>> On 11/28/2016 02:12 PM, Raoul Bhatia wrote:
>>> I've successfully transitioned existing StartSSL certificates + HPKP /
>>> HSTS to letsencrypt.sh (via the Debian package).
>>> I know I am not the first to do such a thing, but maybe you'd like to
>>> have some quick pointers to get this resolved ASAP.
>>> Raoul
>>> PS. The most important thing is to initially tell letsencrypt.sh to
>>> reuse an existing private key for requesting new certs.
>> And that is exactly why I never use HPKP - it does not give the system
>> administrator any flexibility when a new cert / key is needed.
>> In theory there should be a backup key already with a pin to take care
>> of cases where the private key is compromised, but as soon as you have
>> to use it you are vulnerable to bricking the site for some users if that
>> key needs to be revoked.
>> It also gives no flexibility whatsoever when you have to fire a system
>> administrator who may have had access to private keys. Normally in that
>> situation you generate new keys, but with HPKP you are stuck keeping the
>> old keys active until the new keys have had their pins in the header
>> longer than the TTL.
> This issue can be solved by using sort life spans for certificates/keys
> like lets encrypt does. At least it reduces the drawbacks

No it doesn't solve the problem, the certificate lifespan has nothing to 
do with the private key.

>> Why people like HPKP so much is a real mystery to me.
> Because HPKP recreates some level of trust in a (almost) compleately
> broken and highly flawed system?

It's a broken solution that only somewhat works for one very specific 
application of x509 certificates.

A better solution (DANE) exists, is not limited to HTTPS, and doesn't 
prevent you from deploying freshly generated private keys in an emergency.

But Google pushed HPKP out on the market in a Chrome release and that 
was that.

What's interesting, under some conditions Chrome doesn't even enforce 
HPKP which is kind of suspicious and makes it somewhat useless.

e.g. on Chrome HPKP would be useless against a fraudulent certificates 
signed by the root key that Lenovo or Dell added to the root store on 
user's systems.

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