[Ach] Cipher List Notes

[femir at qweepi.de]

>> There is a key missunderstanding here. Having a broken random number
>> generator is the worst case scenario. But having a number generator with
>> a minor flaw, will not affect RSA keys, while it will breakt DSA keys.
>
> But with forward secrecy new keys are generated for each session in
> which case even RSA keys could be cracked faster than brute force even
> if the long term key wasn't cracked and was generated on a machine with
> a proper generator.

A single key for a single session, maybe (although as I understand it
RSA is not as easily affected in this case either).
But while with RSA only a session key will be compromised, with (EC)DSA,
the longterm DSA key for authentication will be cracked as well.

I don't know the chance, they will be lower but lets say one in a
thousand operations uses weak randomness.
That would only affect 0.1% of all users of the server with RSA.

Assuming your server has a thousand connections per hour, after that
time everyone will be compromised when DSA is used.


But lets assume there are mitigation that reduce the chance of this
happening to a minimum, making it unlikely to ever occur in 100 years.
It will still be an unneccessary risk.
No idea how low the chances really are.