[Ach] Modernizing Cipherstrings (once again) [Re: Looks like SSLv3 is enabled for httpd in spec?]

Adi Kriegisch adi at kriegisch.at
Fri Mar 4 21:36:10 CET 2016


> > I'm not exactly sure what the camellia crap is doing there and this
> > looks fishy and overly complicated to me in many ways, but anyway:
> Because - you know - what if AES is backdoored by NSA or something.
Oh well... It all began with removing weak ciphers; at the time the ecrypt
paper stated that CAMELLIA as well as AES was just fine.
Now as Firefox/Thunderbird dropped support, removing CAMELLIA is just fine.

> While we're add it; especially for HTTPS: I think it would make a lot of sense to get rid of the Cipherstring-A. It's not used anywhere in the actual Applied Crypto Hardening document and I think current browsers will have a hard time establishing any connection with that preferred suite.
Actually cipherstring A was never meant to be defined by us. It was
meant to be defined by the admin who knows more about the environment
and the clients connecting whereas cipherstring B was designed to work
'everywhere' -- a secure, general purpose cipher string that works with
OpenSSL v0.9.8 as well as v1.0.2.

I rather believe we should rename cipherstring B to C and define a next
generation cipherstring B using something like OpenSSL v1.0.1 as a baseline
(we, of course, need to evaluate current distributions and the OpenSSL
versions used there).

-- Adi
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