[Ach] Vote for new Cipherstring B [Was: Issue with OpenSSL >0.9.8l]

Aaron Zauner azet at azet.org
Thu May 15 21:54:49 CEST 2014

David Durvaux wrote:
> Mmmm...
> Why getting rid of longer keys?? Probably the people who should take
> care of using AES128 instead of AES256 shouldn't stick to our document only.
> On the other side, AES256 could be consider to be at least as secure as
> AES128.  I don't see any reason to exclude it because it's safer...  
> For me we HAVE to exclude unsecure algorithm but we SHOULD keep
> variation of algorithm that are at least as secure as the minimal
> version we keep.
> On top of that, it's also possible that some people exclude AES128 for
> some reasons and offering a longer set of algorithm COULD in some case
> increase the compatibility.  That's probably not frequent but who knows...
> So in short, I would keep AES256 and add AES196 ;).
I don't see AES-192 in there:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml :)

As I said, cryptography libraries that do support AES will support 128
and 256 (I know of no exception) - as such 128 will never be chosen,
it'll reduce the ridiculous length of the cipherstring a bit - which is
good since some daemons have problems with cipherstrings that long (e.g.

That said - it was just a note that we may want to discuss, the
important part is getting the cipherstring right to work on
OpenSSL1.0.0+ and 0.9.8.


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