[Ach] bettercrypto.org using non-optimal crypto?

[Torsten Gigler]

Hi Alan,

may I suggest to check the ciphers that are active on your browser:
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewMyClient.html
And provide the Ciphers you get back from ssllabs.com.
(This is the expected standard for Chrome 34:
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewClient.html?name=Chrome&version=34&platform=OS%20X
)

According to ssllabs, the server 'bettercrypto.org' should choose: Chrome
34 / OS X
<https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewClient.html?name=Chrome&version=34&platform=OS%20X>
 R  TLS 1.2  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9e)   FS

from the ciphers that your browser supports.

Kind regards
Torsten


2014-07-08 11:06 GMT+02:00 Aaron Zauner <azet at azet.org>:

> Hi Alan,
>
> Alan Orth wrote:
> > Thanks for the explanation, Pepi and Aaron.  The choices seem reasonable
> > now that you explained the logic.
> Short update on that; I asked Adam Langley from Google via Twitter
> yesterday why Chrome does not support a stronger HMAC. He pointed out
> that AES-CBC mode is still susceptible to the Lucky13 Attack, which I -
> to be honest - totally forgot about.  So your concern is valid.
>
> What I don't understand is why your Chrome did not negotiate for
> AES-GCM. On which platform are you testing this (OS and architecture)?
>
> Aaron
>
>
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