[Ach] Proposal to Remove legacy TLS Ciphersuits Offered by Firefox

[Rainer Hoerbe]

+1 for 3DES. And also prioritizing AES128 over AES256 in suite B for the same reason. This saves approx. 40% cpu cycles, and 128-bit security still has lots of reserve.

- Rainer
Am 05.01.2014 um 16:55 schrieb Aaron Zauner <azet at azet.org>:

> Hi Kurt,
> 
> That is true, the issue being that some software and hardware platforms do not support RSA keys above 2048bit as of now.
> 
> I mean - I do not really have an issue with discussing to put 3DES in there. We were a bit time restricted to do our research (i.e. we limited ourselves to certain ciphers) and since this is still in draft stage we're able to change things like that.
> 
> Input from anyone else on the list?
> 
> Thanks,
> Aaron
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jan 5, 2014 at 4:27 PM, Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be> wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 12:19:10AM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote:
> >
> > > 3DES isn't broken.
> > Triple DES provides about 112bit security (We've a section on the topic in the Paper in the Keylenghts section). All ciphers that we
> > recomend are at least at 128bit security.
> 
> The document doesn't seem to say that it's trying to reach a 128
> bit security level over the whole chain.  It seems to be happy
> with 2048 bit RSA keys.  They also provide 112 bit security.
> 
> If you really want to go for 128 bit, you need to have the RSA
> keys of at least something in the order of 3072 bit.  If 2048
> is fine, 3DES is fine.
> 
> 
> Kurt
> 
> 
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