[Ach] SSH improvements
azet at azet.org
Sun Nov 17 17:06:00 CET 2013
On 17 Nov 2013, at 16:51, christian mock <cm at coretec.at> wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 17, 2013 at 03:30:18PM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote:
>> On a second thought:
>> We should not exclude Rhosts/RhostsRSAauthentication. A lot of people use pre-shared keys.
> I'm not sure we should go into that type of question anyways, I think
> it's out of scope for this paper.
> What we could go into: remind admins that their ssh server and user
> keys are probably rather old and only 1024 bits long... Shall we
> recommend to not use DSA server keys at all?
This is why I only set an RSA key, usually you specify DSA and RSA host keys with the `HostKey` option.
We could get rid of RSAAuthentication since it only applies to SSH v. 1.
> Another issue section: why is “diffie-hellman-group14-sha1” excluded?
> that is a 2048 bit exchange…
My mistake, I was trying to avoid EC groups. Feel free to add it.
> Also, how does one specify the DH key size for
> diffie-hellman-group-exchange- sha256 and
> And what is the algorithm to actually negotiate a cipher? Because it
> doesn't seem to depend on the order that you give in the "Cipher"
A name-list of acceptable symmetric encryption algorithms (also
known as ciphers) in order of preference. The chosen
encryption algorithm to each direction MUST be the first
algorithm on the client's name-list that is also on the
server's name-list. If there is no such algorithm, both sides
BTW, the RFC also specifies OpenPGP:
The following public key and/or certificate formats are currently
ssh-dss REQUIRED sign Raw DSS Key
ssh-rsa RECOMMENDED sign Raw RSA Key
pgp-sign-rsa OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates (RSA key)
pgp-sign-dss OPTIONAL sign OpenPGP certificates (DSS key)
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