[Ach] about the 3DES thing again

[Adi Kriegisch]

Hi!

> > In my opinion it is the main target group (sysadmins) that just see the
> > "168bit" in OpenSSL output, see the "128bit or more" recommendation and
> > start using 3DES or assume a mistake in the paper because they (1) do not
> > know that 3DES actually provides 112bit of security at the moment
> 3x 56 = 168. Am I missing something? I have not yet read the NIST publication, but from what I read off the beamer yesterday this just concerns one and two key 3DES variants. Right?
2key-3DES: 80bit, 3key-3DES: 112bit using a meet-in-the-middle attack. I am
sorry, I could not find other resources; only this:
http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/6345/why-is-triple-des-using-three-different-keys-vulnerable-to-a-meet-in-the-middle

-- Adi
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